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In reply to Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Do We Care Enough About
Racial Inequality? Reflections on The River Runs Dry, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev.
PENNumbra 119 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
12-2009/Charles.pdf; Girardeau A. Spann, Response, Doctrinal
Dilemma, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 129 (2009), http://
www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Spann.pdf.
The prime target of my analysis in The River Runs Dry: When Title
1
VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws is the false assumption
that “‘affirmative action–less’ admissions policies and plunging minority admissions are the inevitable outcome of compliance with state an2
ti–affirmative action laws.” As I explain in the introduction,
This Article has two central conclusions. First, it concludes that state anti–affirmative action laws do not prohibit race-conscious policies used for
the purpose of remedying unjustified racial disparities in admissions.
Second, the Article establishes that whether such racial disparities in
admissions are legally justifiable under Title VI hinges on a normative assessment—whether SAT scores accurately reflect the college performance ability of minority applicants who apply to selective public universities. A major implication of these conclusions is that, although
frequently accused of illegally favoring minorities using “under the table” affirmative action, affirmative action-less universities are admitting
so few minorities that the racial disparities in admissions to those institu†
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tions establishes a rebuttable legal presumption of a Title VI disparate
3
impact violation.

The River Runs Dry analyzes admissions rates to the top-ranked
public universities in the two states that have operated under state anti–affirmative action laws the longest: California and Washington. It
shows that there have been racial disparities in admissions to such institutions—African American and Latino applicants have been admitted at consistently lower rates than white applicants—and that those
disparities have been sufficiently large to make out a prima facie case
of race discrimination under the disparate impact regulations of Title
4
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The River Runs Dry also explains
that the text of current state anti–affirmative action laws prohibits
5
“discrimination” and “preferential treatment” on the basis of race,
but—contrary to what is often assumed—such laws are not complete
bans on race-consciousness or race-based affirmative action. In the
article, I suggest that race-based affirmative action in selective admissions may be legal under anti–affirmative action laws if undertaken to
remedy racial discrimination, or, more specifically, to comply with
Title VI disparate impact law. This is because state courts may decide
that considering race to avoid race discrimination either is not a “racial preference” or constitutes racially preferential treatment that is
legally permissible under the “federal funding exception” to anti–
6
affirmative action laws.
In his response to The River Runs Dry, Professor Girardeau Spann
describes my argument as “both analytically sound and enticingly
7
clever.” Nevertheless, he suggests that it might be subject to a “potentially fatal flaw”—that the article’s doctrinal arguments are unlikely
to be adopted by courts because of the dispositive role that politics
8
and ideology play in the interpretation of law. In contrast, Professor
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See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1092 (noting that under the exception, anti–
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federal funding, although public colleges and universities have not invoked it).
7
Girardeau A. Spann, Response, Doctrinal Dilemma, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 129, 129 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Spann.pdf.
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Guy-Uriel Charles’s response to The River Runs Dry commends the ar9
ticle’s doctrinal arguments and its broader normative observations.
Professor Charles pointedly observes that by demonstrating that “legal
10
tools are available for addressing the problem of racial inequality,”
my article raises a fundamental question: “What, then, accounts for
the failure of courts, specifically the Supreme Court, to take seriously
11
the problem of racial inequality?” Both responses offer valuable insights with which I agree.
I agree with Professor Spann that broader critiques of racial exclusion are essential to analyzing how state anti–affirmative action laws
should and are likely be interpreted. Also, I readily acknowledge, as
Professor Spann observes, that I do not offer such a critique in The
River Runs Dry. As Professor Charles’s response recognizes, not only
do I seek to end scholarly inattention to the actual doctrinal implications of anti–affirmative action laws, I use my doctrinal analysis to bolster my claim that state anti–affirmative action laws are only partially
to blame for the racial disparities in admissions to top-ranked public
universities subsequent to the passage of such laws. Through its empirical and doctrinal analysis, my article seeks to reignite intellectual
and political interest in considering whether universities required to
comply with state anti–affirmative action laws are legally required to
be “affirmative action-less.” The responses of Professors Charles and
Spann to The River Runs Dry are important and insightful examples of
12
just such inquiry.
Nevertheless, in this brief Reply, I focus on the conclusions
reached by Professors Charles and Spann with which I disagree. First,
I address facts both professors seem to presume about the SAT’s ca-

overcome strongly motivated political opposition—especially with respect to the issue
of race.”).
9
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Do We Care Enough About Racial Inequality?
Reflections on The River Runs Dry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 119, 125 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Charles.pdf (acknowledging that
the arguments in The River Runs Dry show that “the problem is not singularly legal” and
instead reflect that little weight has been afforded to the dignity of minorities in constitutional analysis).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 121.
12
For example, Professor Charles relies on my analysis to conclude that racial inequality persists because “the Court is self-consciously making a choice, on the basis of
variables other than ‘law.’” Id. at 125-26. Professor Charles asserts that the Court’s political analysis impedes its legal analysis: in his view, the factors the Court considers in
its constitutional analysis reflect a lack of “empathy [and] sympathy for the plight of
people of color.” Id. at 126. Essentially, he argues that courts—particularly the current U.S. Supreme Court—“do not care enough about racial inequality.” Id. at 121.
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pacity to identify the most qualified college applicants that can be legitimately contested. Second, I elaborate on my conclusion that state
anti–affirmative action laws should be interpreted to permit a university to adopt a remedial affirmative action policy if justified by sufficient
evidence that race-consciousness in admissions is necessary to comply
with Title VI disparate impact law. Specifically, I challenge Professor
13
Spann’s assertion that the holding in Ricci v. DeStefano undermines
my article’s conclusion that state courts should import the strongbasis-in-evidence standard developed under the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence to evaluate a university’s claim that it must consid14
er race to comply with Title VI federal civil rights law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci does not overtake my argument; it adopts a
15
similar one in the employment context.
I. CARING ENOUGH ABOUT TEST DEFICIENCY
One of the central observations that I make in The River Runs Dry
is that selective public universities could diminish the large racial disparities in admission rates that have been typical under affirmative action-less policies without violating the legal dictates of state anti–
affirmative action laws. Far from seeking to demonstrate that legal
doctrine, in and of itself, has the capacity to ameliorate such racial
disparities in admissions, my article’s central goal is to show that perceptions about the predictive and sorting power of standardized college admissions tests greatly influences Title VI disparate impact anal-

13

129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). This case, decided after the publication of The River
Runs Dry, dealt with a “reverse discrimination” lawsuit filed by a predominantly white
group of firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut.
14
See Spann, supra note 7, at 135 (arguing that the Ricci decision has “overtaken”
my argument for the strong-basis-in-evidence standard).
15
Although the Ricci plaintiffs argued differently, the Ricci majority opinion accepts that New Haven’s consideration of race in deciding whether to use results of an
employment test does not violate the disparate treatment provision of Title VII if the
public employer has a strong-basis-in-evidence to fear disparate impact liability. Where
the four dissenters and Justice Kennedy disagree is whether “good cause” or “strongbasis-in-evidence” is the appropriate evidentiary standard in such a circumstance. In
fact, based on Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, I would suggest that it is worth considering
whether state courts should go further than I suggested in The River Runs Dry. Perhaps
state courts should interpret the federal funding provision to mean that an employer or
university that demonstrates a “good cause” to fear disparate impact liability has demonstrated that remedial race-consciousness would be consistent with the anti–discrimination
requirement of state anti–affirmative action laws and would also be legally permissible
race-consciousness because it “must be taken” to maintain Title VI federal funding.
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16

ysis in this context. Essentially, The River Runs Dry questions the prevalent but insufficiently questioned view that the SAT is a master tool
for differentiating between the best and the best of the best applicants to
17
college.
The facts in the Ricci firefighter promotion case (which both Professor Charles and Professor Spann use as an example in their responses) parallel the scenario I consider in The River Runs Dry. In my
article, I consider the legality, under state anti–affirmative action law,
of remedial race-consciousness undertaken by a university that legitimately fears Title VI disparate impact liability because it cannot demonstrate that its disproportionate rejection of the state’s most qualified African American and Latino high school students is an
educational necessity. In an analogous manner in Ricci, the Court assessed the legality, under federal employment discrimination law, of
New Haven’s fear of Title VII disparate impact liability because it
could not justify as business necessity its failure to promote the African
18
American and Latino firefighters. In The River Runs Dry, I assert that
considering race in admissions is genuinely necessary—essential to
maintaining Title VI federal funding—if a university has a strong basis
in evidence to fear Title VI disparate impact liability even if it might
be possible for the institution to avoid liability by some conceivably
19
race-neutral means. Ricci applies the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to remedial race-conscious actions undertaken after an employer
20
has administered an exam.
My point in The River Runs Dry is that Title VI disparate impact law
prohibits federally-funded universities from relying on differences in
tests scores that do not correlate to real-world differences in student
16

See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1109-11 (defining and describing “test deficiency” theories); see also West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (considering the legal implications of theoretical and predictive deficiencies of conventional standardized tests).
17
Interestingly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1970), the Court
characterized the opposite view as the “commonsense proposition” Congress intended
to mandate under Title VII disparate impact law—that “tests are useful servants” but
“they are not to become masters of reality.” Id.
18
See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
tbl.1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344 (showing the scores and racial
identification of candidates passing the New Haven lieutenant test at issue in Ricci).
19
See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1084.
20
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“To succeed on their motion, then, petitioners must
demonstrate that there can be no genuine dispute that there was no strong basis in
evidence for the City to conclude it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified
the examination results.”).
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academic qualifications. In the selective university and Ricci firefighter selection contexts, the issue is what happens when the decisonmaker becomes aware that a particular standardized test, although capable
of screening out unqualified applicants, has limited capacity to differentiate among high scorers. Is race consciousness legal when a test
user cannot prove that the predominantly white group of the highest
of the high scorers on the test is truly the best of the best? The key evidentiary question becomes whether the scores on a particular standardized test are sufficiently precise measures such that it can be
proved with a significant degree of scientific accuracy that applicants
with higher test scores are the most qualified. Had the Court addressed this question in the Ricci firefighter lawsuit, it would have
asked: Can a true scientific basis be established for concluding that
firefighters with the lieutenant exam top-ten test scores—a group that
included no African American firefighters—had better supervisory firefighting skills than those who finished in the top sixteen, a group that
21
included three African Americans?
In contrast to less selective public universities that must sift
through their applicant pool to weed out unqualified applicants, Professor Spann is correct that the focus of highly selective universities is
22
on identifying the best applicants. In fact, because the standardized
test scores and grade point averages of applicants to top-ranked colleges and universities have risen at such high rates over the past dec23
ades, I would go even further. The nation’s most selective educational institutions are selecting the best of the best. In contrast to less
selective universities—institutions with pools of applicants with more
mixed academic records, some weak and some strong—highly selective universities may find it difficult to prove that a particular standardized test like the SAT can make fine distinctions among large groups
of highly qualified applicants, pools of applicants almost all of which
have very strong academic records.

21

See generally Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 18 (arguing that the Court’s
treatment in Ricci of city’s decision to disregard racially skewed employment test results
as disparate treatment against white firefighters was inappropriate).
22
See Spann, supra note 7, at 134 n.27 (reviewing my characterization of the difference between selectivity at prestigious private universities and public universities).
23
See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
29-30 (1998) (pointing out that competition for admission at selective schools has increased dramatically, with SAT scores for both white and African American applicants
continuing upward).
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Whether courts will be convinced that universities have a strong24
basis-in-evidence or “good cause” to conclude that race-conscious
admissions are necessary to comply with Title VI depends upon
whether rejected nonwhite applicants, universities, courts, federal civil
rights enforcement agencies, and legal scholars accept “the operating
assumption . . . that large racial disparities in rates of admission to an
affirmative action-less university need no explanation because they
25
track racial disparities in SAT scores.”
In my view, how legitimate it is for a university to fear losing federal funding due to the investigation or adjudication of a Title VI disparate impact administrative complaint requires analysis of the capacities or deficiencies of the standardized test that institution uses for
selection. The lack of such “test deficiency” analysis explains the lack
of legal and policy reaction to the racial disparities in admissions at
selective public universities that has followed the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws. Even if state anti–affirmative action laws may
be interpreted by state courts to permit remedial race-conscious action to comply with Title VI disparate impact law, whether such action
is taken will depend on universities’ assessments of the capacity of tests
like the SAT to measure differences in applicants’ comparative academic “merit” and qualifications.
II. RELEVANCE OF THE NEW RICCI RULE
The River Runs Dry posits that, in interpreting state anti–affirmative
action laws, state courts should borrow the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard from the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence. I argue
that this will enable courts to evaluate the legality, under state law, of
the actions of universities that voluntarily consider race in admissions
in order to comply with Title VI disparate impact law. A key aspect of
my analysis in The River Runs Dry is its distinction between “diversity
24

Four members of the Court concluded in Ricci that the less stringent “good
cause” evidentiary standard is consistent with Title VII precedent in this area. Ricci,
129 S. Ct. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). I do agree with Professors Charles and
Spann that the Court’s strong-basis-in-evidence standard, particularly as applied in Ricci, is an onerous one. Again, this may mean that the “good cause” standard, as articulated by Justice Ginsburg’s Ricci dissent, is an equally or more appropriate standard for
state courts to adopt in evaluating remedial race-consciousness in admissions undertaken by universities to comply with Title VI disparate impact law.
25
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1103-04; see also id. at 1104 (“This presumption is
so strong that the fact that the rate of admission of African American and Latino applicants may be much lower than the rate of admission for applicants of other races is
rarely discussed by commentators who accuse institutions of granting admissions preferences to minority applicants in violation of state anti–affirmative action law.”).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

312

[Vol. 158: 305

justified” affirmative action and remedial affirmative action. To date,
diversity-justified action is the type of race-consciousness that universities most often purport to use and it is the type that was recognized as
26
constitutional by a five-Justice majority in Grutter v. Bollinger.
My
project is not considering whether state anti–affirmative action laws
are likely to be interpreted by state courts to constitute complete bans
on diversity-justified affirmative action. Instead, its focus is the permissibility of a university’s remedial consideration of race under state
anti–affirmative action laws.
As noted by Professor Charles, the Court’s ruling in Ricci arguably
27
reinforces the analytical soundness of my article’s suggestion. After
Ricci, a public employer that refuses to base promotions on the results
of an already-administered test because the employer thinks racial
disparities are unjustified by “business necessity”—and thus violate
Title VII—must have a “strong basis in evidence” for a race-conscious
28
decision not to rely on the test results. The rule articulated in Ricci
would be consistent with a state court’s use of the strong-basis-inevidence standard or even the less stringent good cause standard to
evaluate university claims that race-consciousness in admissions is ne29
cessary to comply with Title VI.
Professor Spann suggests that my interpretation of the federal
funding exception to state affirmative action laws is less consistent
with strict scrutiny than Professor Eugene Volokh’s interpretation of
30
that provision and that the Court’s decision in Ricci further supports
31
Professor Volokh’s view. This is an incorrect assessment for several
reasons. My point in The River Runs Dry is that the plain meaning of

26

539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)
See Charles, supra note 9, at 125 (“Ricci . . . , as a theoretical matter, entertains
the notion that state actors can take race into account (at least under Title VII) to minimize the racial impact of a standardized test . . . .”).
28
Ricci’s holding was directed at compliance with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2006)—the federal civil rights statute upon which Title VI legal doctrine is
based.
29
Professor Charles made this point in his response by contrasting Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci. See Charles,
supra note 9, at 124-25 (arguing that the Ricci approach is preferable because it allows
consideration of race to counter regulations with disparate impact).
30
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive
Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1386-87 (describing the federal funding exception as a
tool to counter potential arguments that Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights
Initiative, would cost California money).
31
See Spann, supra note 7, at 135-36 (arguing that the Ricci standard is nearly impossible to satisfy).
27
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the text of state anti–affirmative action laws, combined with their
32
adoption history, explicitly permits remedial race-consciousness.
This permit is irrespective of what seems to be Professor Eugene Volokh’s conclusion—that race-consciousness is only permissible under
such laws if “genuinely necessary” because no race-neutral action
33
would preserve federal funding.
Professor Volokh’s position is that state courts should interpret
anti–affirmative action laws to impose what I would describe as
“hyperstrict” scrutiny to any type of race-conscious action, whether
34
remedial or diversity-justified. While a significant number of the Justices on the current Court appear inclined to impose hyperstrict scrutiny to racial classifications, Justice O’Connor’s version of strict scrutiny—review that is not “fatal in fact”—remains the Court’s current
constitutional rule. This is evidenced by the fact that the University of
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy survived strict
35
scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger and by Justice Kennedy’s suggestion in
his concurring opinion in Parents Involved that certain types of nonindividualized race-consciousness would, in his view, survive strict
36
scrutiny. More significantly, the analytic framework introduced by
The River Runs Dry that is missing from Professor Volokh’s analysis is
recognition that despite the misnomer of “anti–affirmative action laws,”
such laws are, in fact, antipreference and antidiscrimination laws.
As I explain in The River Runs Dry, the language of state anti–
affirmative action laws, which contain numerous exceptions allowing
racially preferential treatment, does not support interpreting the federal funding exception as imposing a hyperstrict scrutiny standard of
review. The strong-basis-in-evidence standard and, perhaps, the good
cause standard are sufficiently stringent to fulfill the antipreference
goal of anti–affirmative action laws while remaining true to the antidiscrimination objectives of such laws. The argument in favor of interpreting the federal funding exception as I suggest is that the text of
state anti–affirmative action laws prohibits racially preferential treat32

See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1157 (contrasting this view with Professor Volokh’s interpretation of the federal funding exception, which “should be rejected” given that “the text of the exception, if so interpreted, would have no practical effect”).
33
See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1387 ( “If it’s possible to be eligible [for federal
funds] without the discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited . . . . [i]f the
state can switch to a nondiscriminatory program that will still provide the federal
funds, then the discriminatory conduct remains impermissible.”).
34
Id. at 1386-87.
35
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,, 343 (2003).
36
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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ment, not all race-consciousness. The River Runs Dry does not assert
that Title VI requires federally funded universities to adopt remedial
race-based affirmative action policies. Instead, it makes the point that
such policies remain permissible in states with anti–affirmative action
laws if a university can meet the appropriate state law standard for
demonstrating that the race consciousness is remedial rather than diversity-justified.
While it is certainly true that the positions of Chief Justice Rehn37
quist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Grutter and of Chief Justice
38
Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas in Parents Involved indicate that these Justices are intent on taking a Volokh-like approach
to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy’s opi39
nion in Ricci stops short of imposing that new rule of hyperstrict
scrutiny to all race-consciousness action in the interpretation of feder40
al civil rights statutes. This is all the more reason my suggestion as to
how state courts should review remedial affirmative action is superior
to Professor Volokh’s. The interpretation of anti–affirmative action
laws most consistent with these laws’ dual prohibitions against racial
preference and racial discrimination is one that applies a nonfatal
standard of review to a public university’s proven need to engage in
remedial race-consciousness. The River Runs Dry asserts that anti–
affirmative action laws should be interpreted to permit a university to
present evidence in support of a remedial need to adopt an affirmative action policy.
The political discourse ultilized to convince voters to support or
oppose state anti–affirmative action laws—particularly that surround-

37

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732.
39
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
40
Although Professor Spann correctly concludes that the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas seem to evidence an ideological
goal to effectively ban the consideration of race to implement the goals of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), see Spann, supra note 7, at 137 n.40, Justice Kennedy’s opinions
in Parents Involved and Ricci decline to go as far as the rest of the anti–affirmative action
block of the Court. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy refused the plaintiffs’ invitation to strike
down the disparate impact provision of Title VII as violating the Equal Protection
Clause. Or, to use the more violent metaphor offered by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Ricci, Justice Kennedy did not wage “the war” between the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause that Justice Scalia views
as inevitable. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38
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ing the first such law, California Proposition 209 —has been and is
likely to continue to be rooted in ideological opposition to or support
for affirmative action as a policy matter. Yet my focus in this Reply is
that, in interpreting an anti–affirmative action law after its passage,
state courts need not—and in my view, should not—rely on anti–
affirmative action ideology. It would be inconsistent with federal antidiscrimination law and the antidiscrimination provisions of state anti–affirmative action laws for state courts to treat remedial race consciousness to avoid Title VI disparate impact liability as racially
preferential treatment. In addition, even if some state courts presume
that anti–affirmative action laws prohibit diversity-justified affirmative
action, such an assessment does not answer the question of how state
courts should interpret the antipreference and federal funding provisions of such laws as applied to race-conscious action undertaken by
universities to comply with federal civil rights law.
Doctrinal arguments, as Professor Spann makes plain in his response, are not all-powerful master tools. But they do have value.
State courts should interpret state anti–affirmative action laws according to their actual language and overall meaning and not according to
the anti–affirmative action political agenda of those who campaigned
in favor of such laws. That said, I agree with Professor Spann that “[i]t
is also worth noting that even though the Supreme Court has used the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard under strict scrutiny in some of its
constitutional affirmative action race cases, the Court has never found
42
that standard to be satisfied.” In addition to being a central reason
that Professor Charles concludes that “courts do not care enough
43
about racial inequality and the dignity of people of color,” the stringency of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard might justifiably
prompt some state courts to adopt a good cause evidentiary standard
to implement the analytic framework I offer in The River Runs Dry.
CONCLUSION
Professor Charles answers his own astute question of “why the
Clinton and Obama Administrations have not forced public universi41

See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education,
or public contracting.”). Professor Volokh helped draft California Proposition 209.
See VOLOKH, supra note 21, at 1387 (using the federal funding exception to mollify arguments that Proposition 209 would have a large impact on the state treasury).
42
Spann, supra note 7, at 135.
43
Charles, supra note 9, at 121.
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ties in anti–affirmative action states to justify the wide gap between
44
admission rates of white applicants and applicants of color.” His answer is that we do not care enough about racial inequality. I would
add another line of inquiry and potential explanation: it is also possible that we do not care (or know) enough about the deficiencies or
limitations of relying on test scores to select the best of a group of very
qualified applicants.
Finally, there is unquestionable value in taking seriously Professor
Spann’s observations that “the Court’s personnel and the prevailing
political climate” are likely to be more determinative in the Court’s
analysis than doctrinal arguments, including the ones I make in The
45
River Runs Dry. Yet Professor Charles says explicitly what Professor
Spann ultimately acknowledges: so long as the ideological underpinnings of courts’ doctrinal analyses are acknowledged to exist, legal
scholarship must operate in dual domains—doctrinal and ideologi46
cal. This is particularly true in an area made exponentially more
doctrinally and ideologically complex by the emergence of state anti–
affirmative action laws.
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Id. at 122.
Spann, supra note 7, at 138.
46
See Charles, supra note 9, at 126 (arguing that “legal academics need to meet the
challenge in the domain in which it is presented” by acknowledging the political dimensions of the debate).
45

